2 office of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) convened a meeting to discuss what had been achieved by the protocol arguing that there was still a long way to go in terms of making its provisions effective. It was particularly concerned about what happens to a 'one -size-fits-all' type of international standard in different places. In the 'concept note', that was sent in advance to participants, the aim was said to be to 'elaborate recommendations on the applicability of the Palermo Protocol and other provisions directly related to trafficking in persons, to the diversity of national legal contexts and cultures' (Albano, 2009) . It suggested that, in particular, differences in legal culture could provide some clues about how to overcome shortfalls in implementation and bring about more convergence and collaboration amongst the different countries and agencies involved in tackling the problem (or problems) of trafficking.
In this paper I argue that it is certainly helpful to learn more about legal culture as it applies to trafficking and anti-trafficking. But it is also essential to see how the issues involved go well beyond the illuminating power of any one concept. The first part of this paper offers a critical discussion of what is entailed by speaking of this problem as one of a shortfall of enforcement. The paper then go on to show that there are two competing narratives about this social problem and the way it is being responded to and explains why we need to learn more about the interests and values that condition the 'law in action'. In the last section I examine the potential relevance of the idea of the ' legal culture' for explaining the patterns of 'law in action' in and educational assistance and training, to ensure for the physical safety as well as privacy and confidentiality of victims, and to facilitate the possibility of obtaining compensation for damage suffered. In addition, the UN Protocol on Trafficking encourages States to consider adopting appropriate measures allowing victims of trafficking in persons to remain in their territory, either temporarily or permanently or to facilitate the safe and dignified repatriation of victims of trafficking should they desire to return to their place of origin.
3 different countries and different agencies. I conclude by showing how issues about legal culture must be contextualised in relation to the wider question of how far using human rights can produce global standards of justice.
Evaluating outcomes
The Palermo protocol is an example of an international agreement, reached after painstaking attempts to reach consensus that has been ratified by a very large number of countries. The protocol, as the whole convention against transnational crime of which it forms part, has been undeniably successful in gaining agreement on paper from countries in the North and South, from the First to the Third world, from demand, supply and transit countries. Many countries have passed their own domestic legislation related to human trafficking, even if not always exactly in the same terms. Places as different as Italy, Serbia or Norway have introduced 'reflection periods' for the trafficked person to consider his or her choices, and no longer linking the rights of trafficked victims solely to their willingness to give evidence against their captors. In the European human rights community efforts are being made to build on the protocol to reach even higher standards.
Nonetheless, many of those most closely involved with its implementation argue that it has not (yet) brought the results hoped for. It has, so far, only lead to relatively few cases being prosecuted--and has not had a measurable effect on reducing the phenomenon it is supposed to deal with. Basically, there is a large shortfall in implementation and enforcement. According to the concept note, 'of the estimated 600,000 to 4 million trafficked persons, identified, assisted and protected 1 , on average only 6,000 perpetrators are successfully prosecuted every year ' (Albano, 2009) . And many authors continue to put the numbers of trafficking victims even higher (see the introduction to Winterdyk and Reichel, 2010) . What can explain these poor results?
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There are a number of reasons why this question is harder to answer than might seem at first. As with all crimes, the numbers apprehended will be a function of the amount of enforcement effort put in -the number of those prosecuted never matches the actual number of victims. To explain how this happens in different places involves making sense of cross-cultural differences in criminal justice which can be very difficult (Nelken, 2000 (Nelken, , 2010 . Even when it comes to much more straightforward ordinary domestic street crimes such as burglary there is an enormous gulf between the estimated number of offences committed (as calculated for example on the basis of responses to a victimisation survey), and the actual numbers of offenders apprehended, prosecuted and sanctioned. In burglary the same offender may be responsible for many offences. But if the stereotype of transnational organised criminal groups controlling large flows of people is taken at face value, then we would also expect to find that there would be an especially high ratio of victims to criminals in these kinds of cases.
It is true of course that unlike a crime such as burglary, the victims of human trafficking usually do know who is exploiting them (or at least the middlemen or women whom they are in contact with). But, on the other hand, there are a number of special features of this crime to bear in mind. Victims may be physically or psychologically prevented from coming forward-this is indeed part of what is involved in this crime.They may be terrified, not only about what could happen to them, but also what could be done to their families back home. They often do not speak the language or know the local laws -or -on occasion even exactly where they are. Sometime they may suffer from the so -called ' 'Stockholm syndrome' in which captives identify with their captors. Given that they are illegal immigrants, victims will often be frightened of the police, and it is often rational for them to think that the police will not always have their interests at heart. They may have mixed feelings 5 about their situation or its possible improvement-and may consider it preferable to being sent home.
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Despite the existence of a large literature on trafficking we still lack basic knowledge of the gender, age, or backgrounds of potential and actual victims. Some agencies claim that it is not only poverty that places people at risk of being trafficked. It is certainly true that economic migrants are not necessarily those with least resources.
But it seems reasonable to assume that trafficking victims are usually going to be those who are most vulnerable-especially as official attention is overwhelmingly given to those subject to sexual trafficking as compared to other kinds of exploitation.
We also need to learn more about when numbers trafficked go up or down -and how and when trafficking routes shift -and how far this may be a result of economic and political changes or a response to counter-trafficking efforts. are that no more than 10% of the supply is interrupted by the police and customs. So, in addition to criminal law, other levers of social and economic policy must also play a role in responding to trafficking so as to find ways to bring into alignment the different interests of supply, demand and transit countries.
What this means is that, despite the efforts to produce better ' indexes' of trafficking ( Kangaspunta, 2010) , no one really has a clear idea of how many potential cases there could be (and there can be ambiguity in the way the question of 'shortfall' is posed-as when the IOM speaks of those ' identified' 'assisted' and 'protected' as if these were necessarily the same). The main inter-governmental agencies that deal with this problem now generally try to avoid offering firm figures -though this does not stop others from doing so 3 . It is not just the considerable uncertainty in the estimate in the number of cases trafficked-even the lowest of the estimates would represent a massive quota of human misery. The problem rather is that there is no more definite evidence of the lower figure of 600,000 than of the larger figure of 4,000,000. In One response to this difficulty is to seek to sensitise police and other enforcement agencies to the possibility that they are failing to notice victims of trafficking. In the USA those police forces that actually look for these sort of cases -and know what to look for-are much more likely to find them (Farell, McDevitt, and Fahy, 2010) .
Nonetheless, the record also shows that even where enforcement efforts have deliberately been stepped up the results are curiously disappointing. Again and again efforts to find trafficking victims in demand countries such as the USA, UK, Canada, the Netherlands or Ireland, have produced much lower numbers than expected (not to mention the way media claims that the 2006 world cup in Germany would attract forty thousand sex slaves to service the spectators, turned out to have no foundation).
In the USA there were only 1362 official cases in the period from 2000-2007.
Researchers trying to gather a useful sample of cases, frustrated by the lack of official cases, soemtimes fall back on counting cases of prostitutes treated very badly (Winterdyck and Reichel, 2010) . Or they may claim that the low number of victims can be explained as police and even judges persisting on treating cases that could fit the definition of trafficking as cases of smuggling or prostitution tout court (Winterdyck and Reichel, 2010 The official characterisation of organised crime groups often tells us more about political and law-enforcement stereotypes than it does about the fluid and changing nature of the groups and networks involved. It is especially relevant that the smuggling of human beings -the much larger activity of which human trafficking forms a segment-usually involves specialised intermediaries rather than organised crime syndicates (Pastore, Monzini, and Sciortino, 2006) . Even older-type slavery relied heavily on local middle men, small family firms and migrant runners. In the past some of the effort to defeat slavery was misdirected because this point was missed. There is even some danger that massive enforcement effort against trafficking could have the unintended result of increasing the size and sophistication of the professional groups involved so as to allow them to match or corrupt the forces aiming to control them. On the other hand, those powerful organisations who are involved, are able to change their modus operandi in a way that makes it very hard to prosecute according to the definition of trafficking-as in the recent use of so called -'happy trafficking' where they send previously trafficked persons back home to recruit new ones.
We also need to ask why and how prosecution numbers matter. Are they to be seen as a sign of taking victim protection seriously or can they also be an alternative to doing that. The expressed goals of the protocol are to protect and prevent, not only to prosecute. Prevention can and does require different activities to that of prosecution (including education, information campaigns, building institutional capacity, and raising public awareness). Rescue missions set out to save people from captivity.
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Agencies produce booklets with pictures of 'at risk' young women in Nigeria being taught sewing in schools supported under anti-trafficking initiatives. These need to be evaluated in other ways than by looking at the numbers of offenders prosecuted 5 .
In the American legal journals there is also much discussion of how to give victims of trafficking rights to compensation. These responses can sometimes mean investing less in prosecution. Other ways of dealing with the problem are still more controversial. Is the number of immigrants repatriated a fair criterion to be used to measure the effectiveness of the protocol?
Over and above the prosecution of those criminals involved in trafficking we also need to take into account the role of meta-sanctions-or sanctions about sanctionsused against States themselves. Measuring compliance or lack of compliance with such agreed standards is increasingly important as part of the processes of what has been called 'signalling conformity' (Nelken, 2006b) ; the stakes being continuing participation in trade and political networks. At the extreme, States may actually be 5 The concept note ' (Albano, 2009) rightly speaks of a variety of factors that help to explain the 'low levels of protection and prosecution'. 'These reasons' it says ' include, primarily, the lack of conceptual clarity, the relative "newness" of the Protocol, the disproportionate focus on combating irregular migration and on the irregular status of the victims rather than on the violation of their human rights; as well as the disproportionate focus on source countries and supply of potential migrants rather than on destination countries and the demand of low skilled migrant manpower.' It points out that ' while Prosecution refers openly to criminal law tools, Protection and Prevention explicitly employ the language of human rights, recalling some core challenges related to international migration management, human and social development, migrant workers' mobility and the protection of their rights. The overlooking of the human rights dimension in trafficking seems to have resulted in a distorted perception of the phenomenon and, consequently, an often limited process of implementation and application of the Protocol's provisions. ' 11 in collusion with the criminals (Cirineo and Studnicka, 2010) . But the usual aim of international agreements (as with other examples of 'global prescriptions ') is to put pressure on States to do more about prosecution and to bring regulatory bodies into existence or improve the functioning of those that exist. Sometimes one or more selfselected countries will take the lead in promoting compliance (subject to its own political agendas). The most obvious example here being the USA. Although itself hesitant about joining many international agreements on penal law, it is at the forefront of dealing with human trafficking and monitors compliance by other States by placing them in a three (or four) tier classification that has consequences for its foreign aid budgets and the tax levels it applies to foreign imports or investments.
6
Once again we face the vexed question of 'who guards the guardians'?
In sum, measuring the effects of human rights initiatives is a complex matter about which we still have too little experience. What are compliance indicators (good) for?
Which outcomes matter? How do they matter? To whom do and should they matter?
Measuring outcomes cannot just be reduced to number of prosecutions-it concerns much larger issues of 'good governance' 7 . It is difficult to evaluate prosecution numbers without also considering these alternative interventions. Low numbers prosecuted can mean failure to take action, or that the jurisdiction in question is taking a different approach to the problem. Thus they can be a sign of weak or of relatively successful efforts at prevention. And the meaning of these numbers 6 Israel is an example of a country that felt obliged to improve its performance after being classified as unsatisfactory in this way. provide what may seem to them a haphazard way of integrating immigrants (Solivetti, 2010) .
De-constructing the problem of trafficking
All this suggests -or should suggest -that there are limits to the value of answers that can be provided by so called 'administrative criminology', the sort that takes a given definition of crime for granted and restricts itself to considering the operational difficulties of bringing it to book. In fact, many of those who are trying to deal with this multi-faceted phenomenon are the first to recognize that the 'problem' cannot be 'solved' when posed in these terms. We need rather to consider trafficking as an example of the making of a 'social problem' (Rubington and Weinberg, 1981; Spector and Kitsuse, 2001; Nelken, 2007b) . The posited relationship between trafficking and transnational crime has as much if not more to do with national and international responses to the challenges of globalisation as it has to do with concerns for the human victims of this trade. The campaign against trafficking stands at the intersection of a number of controversial issues: the loss of sovereignty of the national State and the shift of power to higher and lower levels; the rise of the threat of transnational organized crime, the regulation of immigration and informal labour, the fight against violence and discrimination against women, the control of prostitution and sex-work., the patrolling of State boundaries and sharpening of the line between citizens and mere 'denizens' (Westmorland, 2010) . In the broadest view the proscription of human trafficking can be seen as an aspect of changing boundaries (whether political, geographical or moral) and the struggle over such boundaries .
13
Without denying that a variety of extremely serious harms are committed by organised and other crime groups it is important to note that the opportunities that they exploit are often created or exacerbated by prohibition itself. In our case this is seen in the way globalisation promotes the free circulation of goods but not people.
As long as this continues, criminals will continue to package people as goods. The desire to immigrate -even illegally-is stimulated by a situation of global ' anomie' in which increasing numbers of people are included culturally in messages of the good life but excluded socially from the possibility of fully enjoying it. The fight against transnational criminals is also not as straightforward as it is made to seem. After the fall of the iron curtain, such criminals took over the place previously occupied by communism as the pre-eminent global threat 8 . They offered a 'suitable enemy' for the reinforcement of State power -the construction of political alliances and larger units such as the European Union, as well as USA -led initiatives. Trafficking may be seen as just one illustration of the 'moral panic' (Cohen, 2004) connected to their activities -and it is interesting that the collapse of communism quickly led to concern about the arrival of prostitutes from former eastern bloc countries. The panic here also draws on a more long standing worries about the ' white slave trade'.
Too often scholars or activists concentrate on their 'own' crime issue to the exclusion of others. The fight against trafficking can also be usefully compared to that being waged against other forms of transnational organised crime, especially as it may be the same organised crime groups engaging in more than one of these activities.There acceptance of the inevitability and even the utility of illegal immigration. Not only do such immigrants take on jobs which the locals no longer wish to do -the low wages they are paid has the function of depressing the pay of other workers-including regular immigrants (Calavita, 2005) .
When it comes to explaining the struggle against transnational crime it often seems that we have to choose between two opposing narratives. One stresses the noble fight of the State, intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies and others to defeat dangerous criminals and extend the scope and reach of human rights (Naim, 2005) .
The other points to the way those seeking to block illegal flows in fact often exploit the problems of given victims for their own interests (Nordstrom, 2007; Van Schindel and Abraham, 2005) . The first repeats obsessively that criminal justice is territorial whereas organized crime is not confined by national boundaries and that therefore international 'collaboration' is the only solution. The alternative view insists that this claim often exaggerates the degree of coordination between organized crime groups and, conversely underplays the way 'governing through international crime' in fact serves as a way of maintaining order at national and local levels (Nelken, 1997b Some authors even go as far as saying that politicians themselves should be seen as trafficking the women involved-or at least competing with criminals to make something of them for their own reasons. It is they after all -and not the organised criminals -who instruct the police to take them back to the places to which they usually do not wish to return, and from which they have often tried to get away (Davies and Davies, 2008) . 9 Against the background of a politics shaped by 'border panic' and xeno-racism, trying to save some people who are particularly badly treated does nothing to stop the mass of irregular illegal immigrants from continuing to be treated as a threat-even if de facto both prostitutes and irregular immigrants continue to supply essential services.
Such overdrawn contrasts have practical implications for the law in action. The legal definitions of the protocol are framed in ways that do not easily fit the fuzzy situation on the ground, as in the artificial line drawn between those who choose to be smuggled and those who are trafficked against their will. Even those being smuggled can in fact also be exploited-women in particular stand a high risk of being raped at some point on their journey. Amongst those who are trafficked, on the other hand, it may be the women themselves, rather than their captors, who patrol compliance. The 9 'In summary, trafficked women in the EEA have proved a useful boon to various political actors. The heady mix of sexual violence, erotic foreigners, and organised crime have offered the ready means by which to introduce legislation and programmes throughout Europe that conveniently serve various political agendas regarding irregular migration and paid sex. It is time that such uses of trafficked women are more openly acknowledged and appreciated by such political actors and that the role of political traffickers in sustaining trafficking is better researched' (Davies and Davies, 2008) .
17 reluctance of such women to be 'saved' may be explained not only by their fears for themselves or their families back home, but also because returning to their countries of origin is seen by them and others as failure. In some circumstances they may even be able to make something useful out of the most difficult of situations, as where they are able to find clients to marry them (Davies 2009a (Davies , 2009b .
Because reliable information is lacking each of the competing narratives is able to produce or highlight different facts about trafficking -or at least offer different interpretation of the same facts. It could almost be said that the narratives produce the facts rather than vice versa. For those who are convinced that there is an enormous 'dark figure' of undetected human trafficking cases, the lack of evidence for this only
shows that there has been insufficient effort at enforcement. Thus the finding that in 
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On internet sites, campaigning groups try to disabuse people of 'myths' about trafficking. They spell out reasons why victims of trafficking are so often 'invisible', and why they are unable to escape from their captors. For their opponents the myths that need to be exposed are the claims that it is easy to hold on to 'sex slaves' against 10 In the UK a major debate followed the very few cases of sex trafficking uncovered in the politically driven police Operation Pentameter, which involved hundreds of raids on sex workers over a six month period. Those involved in the discussion did not take into account Munro's findings that the police tend to use a strict definition of trafficking which insists on proof of lack of consent (Munro, 2005 (Munro, , 2006 . But they warn against the tendency to assume that it is always possible to protect 'perfect victims ' (Giammarinaro, 2007) 1 and emphasise that applying this or any law is not enough by itself. For them a 'cultural revolution' is needed by which migrants are to be seen as human beings in need -not as offenders to be pursued as criminals.
But these agencies argue that all change has to start somewhere and see their efforts What one group will see as a loophole that enforcers need to close, others will see as a necessary limit beyond which it would be improper to proceed (Nelken, 1981) .
Improving the outcome of the Palermo protocol should not be treated as merely a technical question of social engineering because this means that we lose sight of the issue of who stands to benefit or loose from any given intervention.
migrants themselves should not be subject to criminal prosecution on grounds of their irregular entry' (Albano, 2009 ).
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Given that international agreements typically have to paper over differences between those promoting action (Merry, 2006) debates over the ' real meaning' of such agreements are likely to be frequent and ongoing. A large number of groups (with sometimes surprising alliances) have been involved in debating the problem of trafficking -and all of these need to be considered in trying to explain the difficulty of finding and implementing solutions. These include the different State signatories, politicians, civil servants, courts and law enforcers, social workers, women's rights groups, on one side or other of the debate over paid sex work, religious pressure groups, and religious or other charities, the media, and different sectors of the sex industry. Because the agencies involved in dealing with the problem of trafficking each have their own remits we need to ask who is constructing this problem, when, why and how? We also need to distinguish the different local, national and supernational levels where the construction of globalised problems takes place, as well as the different factors relevant in each local context. Many of those concerned with migration and labour rights, for example, complain that the approach usually taken to applying the protocol puts disproportionate focus on source countries and the supply of potential migrants, rather than admitting the strong demand for low skilled manpower in destination countries and the need to raise the standards of work conditions for these workers. Those concerned with women's rights can have different agendas. In the process of framing the protocol, as has been well documented, the CATW and GAATW women's groups had sharp differences (Warren, 2007) . The first argued that all prostitution is violence (the so called ' structural' viewpoint), the rival group insisted on rights of sex workers needing to be kept separate from coerced sex (the so -called 'agency' view).
Attempts to apply the protocol also come up against competing national interests, for On the other hand, the interests involved are not always easy to perceive, even for those involved. Irregular immigrants may help keep wages down-but also stimulate a political backlash. It is easy for outsiders to say that those who are trafficked are being exploited. But some victims may hold to the hope of one day themselves becoming employers, having their own shop, or a group of prostitutes to control.
What I have described as the differences between two narratives concerning the problem of trafficking will not easily be bridged. But there may be some possibility of finding common ground. Strengthening human rights may sometimes be a poor substitute for economic and political change. In an unjust world, however, harsh choices may sometime have to be made which require leaving on one side the larger issue of existing inequalities in order to tackle extreme cases of exploitation. At the same time it is important to recognise that law and policy responses that are geared to dealing with extreme cases of trafficking may not be well suited to hndling the 12 Personal communication from professor Cindy Smith, an American researcher into trafficking.
23 more common and ambiguous types of cases. We should resist the temptation to achieve our aims by creating the illusion of clearer moral boundaries than actually exist.
Legal culture and the implementation of the Palermo protocol
It is important to emphasise the economic, political and ideological interests that have shaped, and continue to shape, the problem of human trafficking 13 . But we must also seek to show how far such pressures actually influence what goes on in the bureacratic, administrative and legal spheres where the Palermo protocol is (or is not)
applied. Paying more attention to differences in legal culture (Nelken, 1997) 14 may help us achieve this.
Fron one point of view such differences represent an obstacle to be overcome through harmonization and cooperation. One of the aims of the protocol was to bring about greater convergence of legal definitions on trafficking so as to harmonise its implementation in different jurisdictions 15 . Professionals with experience in advising in this field explain how to overcome the practical difficulties in realizing an 13 See, for example, the attempt to capture different outcomes in Holland and Sweden by treating them as illustrations of two opposing feminist stances towards trafficking (see Halley et. al. 2007.) 14 For a discussion of why this term is to be preferred to others such as legal system, legal tradition, legal mentalities or legal ideology see Nelken, 2006a. 15 Agreeing to standards such as those embodied in the protocol is itself intended to bring about more similarities, necessary to stop offenders ' taking advantage of differences between jurisdictions. On the other hand, it can be argued that implementation actually needs to be different if contexts and challenges are different.
And there may be value in seeking to safeguard political legal and cultural diversitythis is indeed often the purported aim of other international legal conventions. 24 effective, internationally coordinated response (Gallagher and Holmes, 2008 Arguably, however we first must understand the specificities of legal cultures before we can overcome them-especially as these differences also affect the way supposedly cross-cultural recommendations are actually interpreted and followed.
Researchers regularly (re) discover that countries make use of international agreements according to national understandings, in local ways and, often, for predominately local rather than collaborative purposes. Munro for example, tells us, that police in New South Wales searching for trafficking victims take the opportunity to increase their surveillance of legally recognized sex workers while, in Germany, local administrators continue to work with 'folk knowledge' and resist 'professional ' definitions of the trafficking problem (Munro, 2005 (Munro, , 2006 .
Trying to grasp ' local knowledge' is not just something that may pique the curiosity of the scholarly observer. It also forms part of the everyday task of agencies, police, prosecutors, social workers or others who have to predict what others will do and explain their own practices to them as they seek to cooperate with other jurisdictions (Ross, 2004 (Ross, , 2007 The use made of such discretion is well evidenced by empirical research on law in action in different jurisdictions. At the outset, for example, Australia was the most restrictive of signatories as far as allowing irregular immigrants to stay on in the country (they attached an explicit get out clause to the protocol by which it insisted that it should lead to any increase in immigration). Italy in time, has become one of the less restrictive. The Netherlands lies in between; victims of trafficking there are allowed temporary residence bt expected to cooperate with law enforcement (Munro, 2005 (Munro, , 2006 . On the other hand, whatever the formal rules say, what the police actually do in their law enforcement role may be surprisingly similar across jurisdictions. Munro tells us that it is not only in the UK that the police require proof of (rather than the presumption of ) non-consent, Even in Italy, where the antitrafficking rules also stipulate an exclusive emphasis on exploitation, there remains amongst officials an underlying reluctance to abandon reliance on consent altogether.
Thus, one senior police officer in Rome she interviewed talked persistently about the need to discover the 'very trafficked victims', as opposed to those who, despite having been exploited, were acting with some degree of agency. He explained that you have to prove that you are trafficked-people coming in involuntarily and doing prostitution involuntarily, unwillingly, you are forced, you are under threat. (Munro, 2006) Law in action is a complex combination of local differences in governing principles, rules and procedures of the 'law in books' as well as the patterns that actually exist in the way such differences are instantiated in, used as justifications and alibis, or 'got 26 round', in the 'working rules' of everyday practice. But it is also an aspect of legal culture more generally. (Nelken, 2004) For those interested in using legal culture as an explanation it can be helpful to distinguish between 'internal' and 'external' legal culture-especially where the question concerns the relationship between law and social change (Friedman, 1997) . The term legal culture can point to a number of other contrasts that need to be considered if we are to understand differences in the enforcement of the protocol. It can be useful to know that in some places it is the police themselves who make policy and act as spokesman regarding the handing of transnational crime problems whereas elsewhere this is left rather to prosecutors, judges-or politicians. When it comes to interpreting the meaning of legal culture it can be important to note that 'enforcement'
is not an easily translatable local term in all languages. The same cultural variability 27 applies to almost all the words mobilised explicitly or implicitly when writing about human trafficking, such as rights, security, victims, exploitation, consent, organised crime -or any other word in the Esperanto of international law and human rights organisations
In general, where State law is not well entrenched it may be common to sign on to international agreements whilst not doing much to implement them. But legal culture also characterises the details of enforcement and non -enforcement. Take for example Moldova -one of the poorest countries in Europe and highly dependent on US aid.
Here difficulties in dealing with organised criminals are, in part, the result of absence of specific legislation to deal with these kinds of criminals and an approach to criminal procedure that include resistance to the use of informants and a reluctance to allow plea bargaining, seen as unethical behaviour. At the same time, however, it seems that policemen are often in league with traffickers, cases that are brought against offenders go on for years, judges are said to be often unsympathetic to such cases and traffickers, at worst, are given short prison sentences. Even important officials dealing with trafficking, given prizes for their work, may turn out to be in collusion with traffickers, and there is little internal pressure to bring such officials to book (Finnegan, 2008) .
This said, the term legal culture does not offer any 'quick fix' by pointing us to the crucial intervening variable that will inevitably explain shortfalls of enforcement.
Sometimes culture is no more than a name for what itself needs to be explained by other features of the social context in which such patterns of legally related attitudes behaviour are found (Nelken, 2004 (Nelken, , 2005 (Nelken, , 2007 . If we are trying to use the term to explain what happens in a given country, agency or institution, we have to be careful not to say that they must act as they do because of their legal culture -and still more not to assume that they must continue to act in that way for the foreseeable future. As 28 with the term culture itself this can otherwise lead to a tautology of the sort that goes 'why do the Japanese (police) do what they do? Because they are Japanese! As anthropologists have increasingly insisted, culture is not determining, unitary or unchanging, nor do cultures have hermetic boundaries. Cultures are rarely as coherent as they claim to be. To some extent at least, social actors have a choice in how they draw on their culture(s) so we need to be cautious when we -or theyinvoke culture -or legal culture -to explain or justify the action taken. Culture changes over time and sometimes change is actively sought.The making of laws, as well as the activity of policy makers, presupposes that social practices are not fixed.
So called 'legal transplants' -involving processes of borrowing, imitation or imposition -have always played a large part in the development of legal systems.
With globalisation, pressures to convergence and other transnational trends can more easily blur the differences between places. The question must always be why, and by whom, given patterns of attitudes and behaviour are produced -and reproduced.
It is argued by legal theorists that 'coherence' and consistency is what law claims and needs to achieve. In trying to predict the outcome of anti -trafficking it can therefore be crucial to see how the interventions it inspires interact with other legal rights and obligations such as those that affect tenancy rules in red light districts, the bargaining powers of unionised sex workers, or the attempts to reduce the spread of AIDS (Halley, et. al., 2007) .
We also need to relate legal culture to culture more generally. (The term 'external legal culture ' itself may be seen as one way of conceiving of a transmission belt from wider culture to legal culture). In the case of many proposed international norms there is considerable discussion of cultural differences, and the right to such differences-as in the idea of the alleged distinctiveness of 'Asian values'. But the struggle against human trafficking seems to have earned at least the formal endorsement of a very large number of countries with little attempt to treat this as a 29 specifically Western type of human right. Writers describing the situation in Africa are amongst those most outspoken on the human costs of trafficking (Falola and Afolabi, 2007) . Leading experts on human trafficking who are also Muslims go to great lengths to show that the types of conduct involved in (almost 16 ) all of the types of trafficking that international conventions currently seek to prevent are also strictly condemned by Islam (Mattar, 2004) .
At the same time it is not difficult to point to a variety of more or less entrenched social or cultural practices -whether in supply, in transit or in demand countries -that provide some of the conditions in which such behaviour becomes possible. In some of the supply countries in Asia and Africa there are more or less institutionalised practices that can shade into trafficking. These include bonded labour in agriculture and elsewhere, enforced domestic labour, organised prostitution both for foreign tourists as for locals, gender violence and discrimination, employment of children, bride kidnapping, the marrying off of young brides, the sending away of young people ostensibly for education or work training purposes who are then obliged to earn their keep by begging or worse. In some places prayers are offered up for the success of emigrants including some who might be considered trafficked according to the Protocol. Such remittances as they manage to send back represent an important part of the local economy. In demand countries, by contrast, the practices that may be more relevant include the commodification of sex and labour, the willingness to import anything, from 'orphans' for adoption to body parts, and the assumption that anything can be had at a price -plus local cultural justifications for the creation of as class of ' non-persons'.
16 Mattar (2004) admits that there are important differences between Sunnis and
Shiites over temporary marriage and child marriage before puberty. Some other widespread practices he considers to be a result of tribal law or a misinterpretation of On the other hand, we should not assume that understanding the wider social context will always tell us the character of a given legal culture. Especially, but not only, in less industrially developed societies we need to be aware of the many situations of legal pluralism in which State law competes with rival normative orders, which often encapsulate a different approach to social order based on other loyalties and principles. But, even in relatively homogenous States, the task allocated to State law may be that of being distinctive or in contrast to ordinary culture, for example privileging written rather oral relationships, operating on different time schemes, or generally standing for ideas and ideals that are not (yet) strongly entrenched in everyday practice in wider society. In such societies-or parts of them-actors often speak of battles for the 'culture of legality'. The degree to which law is supposed toor succeeds in being -relatively autonomous from economics and politics -is itself one of the legal cultural variables that needs to be better understood. In the common law world there may be more open and accepted links between law and the needs of the economy, but in the continental European world the more obvious coupling (though one often marked by boundary struggles) is between law and politics. In 17 Though pragmatic cultures may fail to appreciate that pragmatism itself may have its limits, and pragmatism cannot tell them when not to be pragmatic (Nelken, 2009) 31 other settings religious culture may be the most relevant factor to investigate and law no more than one manifestation of it.
Other problems with using the term legal culture also need to be born in mind (Nelken, 2007a) . One of the most important of these has to do with how to decide the 'unit' or level of culture on which to focus. Larger cultural differences ( (Carchedi, Stridbeck, and Tola, 2009 ). According to critics of the term, this promiscuity of references is what makes the term implausible and subject to circular argument (Cotterrell, 1997) . But it could be argued-using the Palermo protocol as an examplethat mapping such multiplicity at the transnational, national and local levels is exactly what is needed.
As these various units respond to the problem of trafficking they are themselves changed in the process. In seeking to understand the legal cultures at work in responding to trafficking it is not enough just to focus on a nation state-taken singly. Recognising that there are differences between legal cultures shows us why if we wish to ensure respect for international legal instruments we need to go beyond the stage of signing and perhaps ratifying them. On the other hand, whilst learning about legal culture can provide us with valuable insights we also need to be careful not to reify culture as a way of making outcomes seem predestined, nor should we assume 33 given choices only have their desired effects. What is felt to be a 'scandal' varies between places, but it also varies over time. The definitions of trafficking proposed by those working in pressure groups, international organisations or in roles of liaison between national administrations will often be different to those used on the ground by locally based politicians, policeman, social workers, or charities. But they can, under some circumstances, eventually serve to transform them.
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Showing that differences in legal culture play out as part of a larger struggle over interests and values is not an argument for inactivity in the face of injustice, but it does suggest that it is not enough to apply general prescriptions based on the goal of extending human rights for the outcomes to be automatically positive. As David Kennedy, a leading Harvard based 'progressive' international lawyer, reminds us, we must be alert to the possibility that even the pursuit of human rights can have negative effects (Kennedy, 2001) . In some places, human rights implementation can make a repressive State more efficient, and co-opt sectors of civil society that might otherwise be opposed. Arguments from human rights have been used to strengthen, defend, legitimate a variety of repressive initiatives-to legitimate war, defend the death penalty, the entitlements of majorities, religious repression, access to (or restriction of) abortion, and so forth.
Of particular relevance for our purposes, Kennedy insists that, as currently deployed, the human rights movement may do a great deal to take questions of the distribution of life chances off the national and international development agendas. He claims that this movement often remains tone-deaf to the specific political consequences of its activity in particular locations, on the mistaken assumption that a bit more human rights can never make things worse. He admits, of course, that all interventions (not 18 It can be interesting to compare the success of other efforts to make criminal justice concepts 'travel well'. For an illuminating discussion of the different fortunes of prison rights and corruption see Twining (Twining, 2005 Their case studies, in places as different as India and Israel, suggest that -'the result, so far at least, is not to "end prostitution" in Israel and India, but to rearrange the micro-investments of power locally'. The authors argue that they are 'working, methodologically, for a new legal realism that would anticipate the complex ways in which legal entities meet complex societies' and complain that ' (t)he highly contingent and complex relationship between law in the books and law in actionand the multitudinous ways in which the legal system can be designed to shape but cannot control this relationship-seem to fall outside the scope of feminist concern.
Feminist advocacy that imagines prohibition to involve "stopping" or "ending" sexual violence and/or commercial exploitation of sex workers brackets all the social contingency our legal realist and critical analysis would bring into focus. For example, the possible bad and unintended consequences of the resulting rules seem to fall outside the scope of feminist concern ' (Halley, et. al., 2007) . All this reinforces 35 the need to consider carefully the likely effects of efforts to improve the application of the protocol.
The main claim of this paper is that, before referring to legal culture in accounting for how different places behave when applying the protocol, we first need to know more about the nature of the 'problem' being faced and the way the way the 'problem' is constructed. I will finish by saying something more about the Italian situation by way One solution to this apparent puzzle could be to say that, whatever the protections offered by the 'law in the books' it is simply not true that Italy is in practice more active in applying the protocol than other countries. Because of the lack of comparable cross-national data on the number of cases dealt with in relation to the 19 In Italy, partly as a result of the influence of Catholic culture, victims are often expected 'to forgive' rather than ask for revenge. Relatedly, as a 'state society', punishing is considered something to be carried out for the ' general interest' by 'the state' (Nelken, 2005) . In many Protestant countries, with a 'liberal' idea of the state, and not merely focus on economics and politics is because of the way in can help us make sense of such apparent paradoxes.
